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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Vicki Slater appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction for possession of a
controlled substance. She argues the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress
evidence found during a search of her car. Mindful of Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), and
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), she nonetheless argues law enforcement unlawfully

searched her car after a positive drug dog alert on her car parked on her friend's driveway.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed a criminal complaint alleging Ms. Slater committed the cnme of
possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.10-11.) This charge arose after law enforcement
searched Ms. Slater's parked car during their execution of a search warrant for a house where
Ms. Slater was visiting a friend. (R., pp.13-15.) Before searching Ms. Slater's car, an officer ran
a drug dog around her car, and the dog alerted. (R., p.14.) At a preliminary hearing, the
magistrate judge found probable cause for the offense and bound Ms. Slater over to district court.
(R., pp.28-31, 32.) The State filed an information charging her with possession of a controlled
substance. (R., pp.37-38.)
Ms. Slater filed a motion to suppress. (R., pp.44-48.) She argued that her car was not
"lawfully stopped" because law enforcement did not initiate a traffic stop. (R., pp.46-48)
Without a lawful stop, she argued, the officer could not run a drug dog around her car.
(R., pp.46-48.) She also argued the search warrant did not justify the search of her car because
the warrant included her friend's house only. (R., pp.47-48.) Accordingly, she asserted the
warrantless search of her car violated her Fourth Amendment rights, and the district court should
suppress any evidence following the search. (R., p.48.)
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The State responded in opposition. (R., pp.49-52.) The State argued a traffic stop was not
required to conduct a drug dog sniff. (R., pp.51-52.) On the validity of the sniff, the State agued
law enforcement were lawfully on the property to execute the search warrant, so they could
conduct a dog sniff around the cars parked on the property. (R., pp.51-52.)
The district court held a hearing on the motion. (R., pp.54-58.) Two police officers
testified. (Tr.,1 p.44, L.12-p.74, L.21.) After their testimony, Ms. Slater argued, because the
search warrant was for her friend's house, law enforcement could not conduct of dog sniff of
Ms. Slater's car. (Tr., p.74, L.25-p.79, L.19.) The State argued law enforcement had a lawful
basis to be on the property (to execute the warrant) and therefore the officer could conduct a dog
sniff of the parked car. (Tr., p.82, L.l-p.84, L.17.) The district court took the matter under
advisement. (Tr., p.85, Ls.14-18.)
A few days later, the district court issued a memorandum decision and order denying
Ms. Slater's motion to suppress. (R., pp.60-66.) The district court made the following factual
findings based on the officers' testimony. (R., pp.60-61.) Law enforcement obtained a search
warrant for a woman's house after an investigation on drug-related activity in the house.
(R., p.60.) The search warrant did not include any cars on the premises. (R., p.61.) Ms. Slater
was visiting the woman when law enforcement came to the property to execute the warrant.
(R., p.61.) Some officers conducted a sweep of the house while other officers remained outside.
(R., p.61.) Law enforcement detained Ms. Slater, and she did not give them permission to search
her car. (R., p.61.) During the execution of the warrant, an officer walked his drug dog around
Ms. Slater's car, and the dog alerted. (R., p.61.) Law enforcement searched her car and found
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There are three transcripts on appeal contained in one electronic document. Pinpoint citations
will reference the overall page number in the bottom right comer of each page. This denotes the
pages of the overall document ( 125 pages total) and not the internal pagination of each transcript.
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methamphetamine. (R., p.61.) Law enforcement determined that the car was registered to
Ms. Slater. (R., p.61.) Law enforcement spoke to her, and she made incriminating statements.
(R., p.61.)
After these findings, the district court determined:
In this case, [law enforcement and the drug dog] restricted their
movements to places where ordinary visitors could be expected to go. Driveway
and parking areas have a diminished reasonable expectation of privacy because
these are areas to which the public is impliedly invited. This is especially true
when the officers are, as in this case, executing a warrant on the residence.
Executing a search warrant is a legitimate purpose. [The dog] was present to assist
in the search for evidence, including drugs and drug paraphernalia. While some
officers were executing the search warrant on the residence, [the officer] walked
[the dog] around all the vehicles parked in the residence's driveway.
Finally, the Defendant and her vehicle do not have a legitimate reasonable
expectation of privacy in [her friend's] residence or the area surrounding the
residence because Defendant was not living at the residence, nor was she an
overnight guest. ... When officers executed the search warrant, Defendant was
merely paying a brief, casual visit to [her friend]. Defendant and her vehicle were
essentially out in the public.
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Under the
circumstances, it is not unreasonable to have a drug detection dog conduct a sniff
around vehicles parked in a driveway, before entering the residence, when
executing a search warrant. Therefore, any privacy right Defendant might hold in
her vehicle was not violated by [the dog's] sniff and alert.
(R., pp.64-65.) The district court further determined the dog's positive alert on the car
established probable cause for the search. (R., p.65.) For these reasons, the district court denied
Ms. Slater's motion to suppress. (R., p.66.)
Ms. Slater entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance.
(R., p.93; Tr., p.91, Ls.14-17, p.94, Ls.10-14, p.95, L.17-p.96, L.12.) The district court withheld
judgment and placed Ms. Slater on probation for two years. (R., pp.102-04.) Ms. Slater timely
appealed. (R., pp.113-15.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Slater's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Slater's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mindful of Rakas and Caballes, Ms. Slater maintains the district court erred when it

denied her motion to suppress because the officer unlawfully ran the drug dog around her car.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court's order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014); State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App.
2013). The Court will accept the trial court's findings of fact "unless they are clearly erroneous."

Wulff, 157 Idaho at 418. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by
substantial and competent evidence. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also Ellis,
155 Idaho at 587. "At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court."

Ellis, 155 Idaho at 587. The Court exercises free review over the "application of constitutional
principles in light of those facts." Wulff, 157 Idaho at 418.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Slater's Motion To Suppress
"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from

unreasonable search and seizure." State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003); see U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable, unless it falls within "one of
several narrowly drawn exception." State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706 (2012).
A showing of a reasonable expectation of privacy (or "standing") is required for the
defendant to challenge the validity of a search.
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"[A] defendant bringing a motion to suppress must show that there was a Fourth
Amendment search, that he has standing to challenge the search, and that the
search was unreasonable. State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 220-21 (2019). If the
defendant makes this showing-for example, by demonstrating a "search" which
violated his Fourth Amendment rights and the absence of a warrant-then the
burden will shift to the State to show an exception to the warrant requirement
exists or that the search was reasonable under the circumstances. Id.

State v. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 905 (2019). In Rakas, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an
individual cannot demonstrate standing solely by "legitimately being on the premises." 439 U.S.
at 143--45. Rakas further established that "one who has no ownership or possessory interest and
is not a resident but who is merely paying a brief, casual visit, has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in a residence." State v. Vasquez, 129 Idaho 129, 131 (Ct. App. 1996). Here, the district
court determined Ms. Slater, as a brief, casual visitor, did not have an expectation of privacy in
her friend's property. (R., pp.64-65.)
Turning to the search itself, a dog sniff is not a search. In Caballes, the U.S. Supreme
Court held "the use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog-one that 'does not expose
noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view,' United States v.

Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)-during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate
legitimate privacy interests." 543 U.S. at 409. Therefore, "[a] dog sniff along the outside of a
motor vehicle does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment." State v. Parkinson,
135 Idaho 357, 363 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 707). Further, the "automobile
exception" to the warrant requirement "allows police to search a vehicle without a warrant when
there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime."

Anderson, 154 Idaho at 706. Combining these two principles, "[a] reliable drug dog's alert on the
exterior of a vehicle is sufficient, in and of itself, to establish probable cause for a warrantless
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search of the interior." Id. Here, the district court determined law enforcement had probable
cause to search Ms. Slater's car after the positive dog alert. ((R., p.65.)
Mindful of Rakas and Caballes, Ms. Slater nonetheless argues law enforcement
unlawfully searched her car when the officer ran a drug dog around her car parked in her friend's
driveway. As argued in her briefing below:
In this case, Ms. Slater was not lawfully stopped in her automobile. Law
enforcement arrived to find Ms. Slater's car parked in the driveway, with Ms.
Slater inside [her friend's] house. Law enforcement had no probable cause to
believe Ms. Slater had violated the law while driving, there was no anonymous or
known tip that Ms. Slater was driving under the influence, or recklessly, or even
carelessly. Ms. Slater's driving was not at issue. Though law enforcement had
authority to search [her friend's] home pursuant to the warrant, the warrant did
not authorize the search of third parties or third-party property, including third
party vehicles.
(R., p.47.) Similarly, as she argued at the suppression hearing:
It was a canine sniff that was not warranted given the circumstances of this
situation. Had Miss Slater been parked on the side of the street, then, by all
means, all of the cases that the State cites in its motion would be applicable. But
because it wasn't in a public place, I don't think that it fits under that exception
that the State was trying to fit it under.

(Tr., p.77, Ls.13-20.) For these reasons, and those argued below, but mindful of Rakas and
Caballes, Ms. Slater maintains the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Slater respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's withheld
judgment, reverse or vacate the district court's order denying her motion to suppress, and
remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 29 th day of December, 2020.

Isl Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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